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This paper investigates the effect of outward foreign direct investments (FDI) on 
home employment in an understudied context - a small economy with a large relative 
outward FDI stock. Using Swiss firm-level data we construct a novel instrumental 
variable to identify a direct negative displacement effect and an indirect positive 
output effect. We find that FDI to high-income countries have a positive effect on 
domestic jobs, while FDI to lower middle-income countries are associated with a loss 
of domestic jobs. Further, FDI to low-income countries tend to have a positive effect 
on home employment. Overall, the effect of outward FDI on home employment is 
small and tends to create more domestic jobs than it relocates. 
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1 Introduction
At present, globalization and international economic interdependence are experiencing
a political setback. In many countries that were previously known for their economic
openness protectionist forces have gained increasing influence. The most striking exam-
ple of this turning away from globalization is the election of Donald Trump in the USA.
The reason for this departure from economic openness is, among others, the fear that
domestic jobs will be relocated.
Accordingly, the discussion about the effects of outward FDI on the domestic job
market is reviving and the benefits of investment treaties are doubted. On the one hand,
proponents of protectionism often regard outward FDI as a classic zero-sum game: The
total number of jobs is fixed and every job that is built up abroad, is a job that is
lost at home. This static idea of firms comes closest to the so-called displacement effect
known in economic theory. Policy makers that support this idea strongly oppose large
scale outward FDI in order to ensure home employment and production. However, this
static idea of the economy does not correspond to what we observe in reality: FDI are
supposed to be crucial to give firms the possibility to remain competitive and guarantee
or even create additional domestic jobs in a longer term. Part of this argumentation is
related to the output effect discussed in economic theory.
Hence, economic theory suggests two important channels through which outward
FDI affect home employment: a negative and direct displacement effect channel and a
positive and indirect productivity or output effect channel. Opponents of outward FDI
focus rather on the displacement effect, while supporters emphasize the output effect
and the importance of FDI for firms in order to remain competitive and to survive.
Economic theory is not able to predict, whether the gain of domestic jobs due to output
effects outweighs the initial loss due to displacement. Therefore, the currently much
discussed political question about the effect of outward FDI on home employment boils
down to an empirical issue.
The goal of this paper is to empirically examine this effect of outward FDI1 on within
firm domestic employment in the context of a small and open economy with a high rel-
ative outward FDI stock, i.e. Switzerland. In particular we aim to answer the question
whether firms that engage in outward FDI increase or decrease home employment due to
foreign activities. This means that we will not consider horizontal and vertical spillover
effects on other firms. There is only limited evidence of these spillover effects. However,
Tang and Altshuler (2015) find positive spillover effects of outward FDI on domestic
suppliers, showing that at least backward linkages appear to affect home employment
positively. Furthermore, we do not take into consideration that firms might have to close
down their business in the longer run, if they do not have the possibility to conduct out-
ward FDI. Hence, the overall effect on home employment is likely to be more positive
1Note that we are interested in operational activities of MNEs and not necessarily in financial flows.
Therefore, we use foreign employment of MNEs instead of actual financial flows or stocks as measure for
foreign activities. It is important to know that FDI as we use it in this paper are operational activities
(foreign employment) and not bare financial flows.
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than our within firm estimates suggest.
We can draw on a broad recent literature, which addresses the same empirical ques-
tion. The literature can be roughly categorized into three approaches: i) papers that
pursue an instrumental variable (IV) strategy, ii) papers that use matching estimators
to form a counterfactual, and iii) a paper that takes a quasi-experimental approach. The
first strand of literature using an IV strategy is most closely related to our method. In
particular, Wright (2013) is quite closely related to this paper. We adopt the empirical
strategy of this paper by estimating the displacement and the output effect in two sepa-
rate steps. Wright (2013) uses sector-level data on US manufacturers and finds a positive
overall effect of FDI on total employment. However, he is as well examining the effect
on high- and low-skilled labor separately and finds that the total effect on low-skilled
labor employment is negative. Among others, the approaches of Desai, Foley and Hines
(2009) and Harrison and McMillan (2011) are as well related to our strategy. Desai,
Foley and Hines (2009) show that greater foreign employment of US manufacturers is
associated with greater domestic employment using firm-level data and applying as well
an instrumental variable approach. Harrison and McMillan (2011) find mixed effects.
They emphasize that it depends on the type and destination of FDI, whether the overall
effect is positive or negative: For firms most likely to perform similar tasks in domestic
and foreign affiliate, foreign and domestic employees are substitutes. However, for firms
that engage in significantly different tasks at home and abroad, foreign and domestic
employments are complements.2
The second strand of literature tries to establish a counterfactual for firms that in-
vest abroad for the first time. This strand of literature compares national firms with
firms that switch from national to multinational status using matching estimators. De-
baere, Lee and Lee (2010) for example, find that South Korean multinational enterprises
(MNE), which invest to countries with a lower income than South Korea face lower em-
ployment growth than comparable national firms. On the other hand, the authors find
no significant difference in employment growth between firms investing in countries with
higher income and comparable national firms. Barba Navaretti, Castellani and Disdier
(2010) find, however, positive effects on home employment for Italian and French MNE,
irrespective whether they invest in low- or high-income countries.
In a third approach, Sethupathy (2013) uses firm-level data and two events in Mexico
as a natural experiment to identify the effects of a fall in the marginal cost of offshoring
to Mexico. He finds no evidence of greater domestic job loss in the US due to offshoring.
Finally, Crinò (2009) provides an excellent overview of the empirical literature of labor
market effects of outward FDI. He finds that FDI mostly have a weak effect on home
2This list is obviously incomplete and there are other papers that are related to our approach. Many
of them focus on the effect on wage or skill intensity. For instance, Hummels et al. (2014) are estimating
the effect of offshoring wage in Denmark using an instrumental variable approach. Another prominent
example are Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2013) who apply as well an instrumental variable approach and
find no negative effect of offshoring on employment level for the US. For a broader overview of offshoring
and its effects on wage, skill intensity, investment as well as job loss and creation see Hummels, Munch
and Xiang (2018)
3
employment and concludes that results tend to be very mixed depending on countries
and offshoring strategy.
Hence, empirical evidence does not clearly show whether overall effects of outward
FDI on home employment are positive or negative. The outcomes vary by context and
might even indicate contrary effects dependent on the destination market and types
of FDI. Or as Lipsey (2004, p.340) puts it in his review of home-effects of FDI: ”The
effect may depend on whether the foreign operations’ relation to home operations is
“horizontal” or “vertical,” [...] the extent to which the foreign operations are in goods
production or in service activities, are in developed or developing countries, or are in
industries with plant-level or firm-level economies of scale.” The existing literature fo-
cuses so far on big economies, while the effect on small economies is clearly less explored.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by analyzing the domestic employ-
ment effect of outward FDI for a small economy, Switzerland. Switzerland has one of the
highest outward FDI stocks and flows relative to GDP in the world and is thus heavily
exposed to the effects of outward FDI. Not surprisingly, some of the largest MNEs such
as Nestlé, Roche or Novartis are located in Switzerland. Hence, Switzerland is not only
a small economy, but, relative to its size, it engages more strongly in FDI than all other
countries examined in the literature so far. Moreover, we construct a novel instrument
for foreign employment and our data contains firms from the service and manufacturing
sector, while the other studies often focus on the manufacturing sector.3
We were able to acquire unique administrative firm-level data from the surveys on
cross-border capital linkages from the Swiss National Bank (SNB). We construct a novel
instrument for the number of employees abroad by using different exogenous predictors
of FDI to estimate the potential employment for each firm in each country in a zero-
stage. The idea to estimate a firms location choices using exogenous predictors is related
to the idea of di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009), who compute potential trade flows per
sector adapting the classic gravity model approach. Using this novel instrument we es-
timate the displacement and the output effect in two different steps.
We find no evidence for the existence of a negative displacement channel and clear
evidence for a positive output channel, when we are considering only FDI to high-income
countries. However, the positive effect of FDI to high-income countries on home employ-
ment is rather small. In the case of FDI to lower middle-income countries, the negative
displacement effect outweighs the positive output effect and, thus, the cumulative ef-
fect on home employment is negative but as well rather moderate. This negative effect
is driven by China and disappears as soon as China is excluded from the estimation.
Further, we find no evidence for the displacement effect and only partially significant
evidence for the output effect of FDI to low-income countries. Again, this potentially
3For instance, Hijzen, Jean and Mayer (2011) focus as well on service and manufacturing sector of
France and find a positive effect for horizontal FDI and no effect for vertical FDI. Crinò (2010) considers
only the service sector in the US and finds positive employment effects for skilled workers, while less
skilled workers might be displaced.
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positive effect is driven by a single destination country, India. Finally, we are not able
to estimate the effect of FDI to upper middle-income countries reliably. Considering all
types of FDI, we find that outward FDI have no clear effect on domestic employment
for Switzerland, if at all, outward FDI tend to create more domestic jobs within the
investing firm than it relocates.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the concep-
tual framework and thus, the above mentioned channels and different types of FDI in
more detail. Section 3.1 presents our empirical strategy and Section 3.2 explains how
the instrumental variable is constructed. The data are described in Section 4. Section 5
presents the results of the empirical application and Section 6 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
Economic theory distinguishes two types of FDI, vertical and horizontal FDI (see e.g.
Markusen and Maskus, 2003), which affect home employment through different channels.
These types are based on different motivations for an MNE to open affiliates abroad.
While it was debated in the early literature which type of FDI is predominant in the
world, there is now a consensus that both types of FDI coexist and are important for
MNEs (Davies, 2008). Because these types of FDI affect home employment potentially
differently (Lipsey, 2004), it is important to understand these diverse types and the
mechanisms behind them.4
2.1 Vertical Foreign Direct Investments (VFDI)
Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) describe VFDI in early models.
The motivation behind VFDI is to exploit differences in factor prices between countries.
This means that a company produces intermediate goods abroad at lower costs and thus
geographically relocates part of the production chain. As a result, there are intra-firm
imports of low-wage goods, which were formerly produced domestically. Therefore, in
this first relocation step, foreign and home production are substitutes and VFDI are sup-
posed to reduce the number of domestic jobs. However, after this immediate potential
displacement of domestic labor, the intermediate goods produced in these foreign affili-
ates are complementary to the production that remained in the home country. Because
factor prices are lower abroad, intermediate goods produced in the foreign affiliates are
cheaper. Due to these cost savings the MNE will be able to gain market shares and,
therefore, to increase production and employment at home and abroad. Furthermore,
an expansion in production abroad leads as well to higher demand for headquarter ser-
vices. Accordingly, VFDI have a negative and immediate displacement effect, as well
as an opposing positive effect via competitiveness and output on domestic employment.
4See Barba Navaretti, Venables and Barry (2006) for a very broad overview of MNE activities and
different types of FDI as well as their effects.
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Because differences in factor prices are the crucial motivation for VFDI, these kind of
investments flow typically from high-wage countries to low-wage countries.
2.2 Horizontal Foreign Direct Investments (HFDI)
In the case of HFDI, not only one stage but the entire production process is replicated in
an affiliate abroad. I.e. the same products are manufactured in different locations. The
motivation behind HFDI is the reduction of transport costs, market seeking, technology
sourcing and exploitation of firm scale economies (see e.g. Markusen, 1984, for an early
version of HFDI models or Markusen and Venables, 2000). Since in the case of HFDI the
same products are manufactured at home and abroad, home and foreign production are
substitutes. Outward HFDI thus tend to reduce domestic exports, which reduces the
demand for domestic employment (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004; Lipsey, 2004).
However, HFDI allow more efficient sales in the foreign market leading to a stronger
penetration of that market and accordingly, an increase in production abroad. This
more complex organization and a further expansion of production due to gains in mar-
ket shares lead to a higher demand for headquarter services and other complementary
products, which are typically provided by the parent company (Helpman and Krugman,
1985). This gain in market share and the following rise in output increases the demand
for domestic jobs. Furthermore, technology sourcing might increase home productivity,
which leads as well to higher output and employment. So, there is again a negative
displacement effect and a positive effect via output. The effect of HFDI on home em-
ployment strongly depends on whether a firm has exported much to a country before
the foreign investment takes place. If there were only few or no exports in the forefront
of the investment, there is little or no home production to be substituted and the dis-
placement effect is negligible or even nonexistent. The more the firm exported to that
country before it opened an affiliate there, the stronger is the displacement effect and
it depends on the size of the output effect whether number of jobs increase or decrease
at home. Because HFDI are motivated by technology sourcing or market seeking, this
kind of FDI typically happens between high-income countries. Thus, according to classic
theories both VFDI and HFDI have ambiguous effects on home employment: negative
displacement effects as well as positive effects due to an expansion in production.
2.3 Trading Tasks
More recently Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) presented an alternative approach
which examines the wage effects of offshoring. Instead of goods, tasks are traded in this
new model. Wright (2013) reformulates this model in order to be able to estimate the
effect on labor demand instead of wage. He, then, decomposes the effect of offshoring
on labor demand in three channels: a direct displacement effect, an output effect and
a substitution effect.5 Wright (2013) differentiates between low- and high-skilled labor
5We do not discuss the substitution effect, because our data is not detailed enough to estimate
this effect. However, the substitution effect is not included in the empirical literature discussed in the
introduction (except in Wright, 2013, of course). Wright (2013) does not find a significant impact of this
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and assumes that only low-skilled labor can be outsourced. The displacement effect
negatively impacts domestic employment, because if firms move more tasks overseas, it
takes less domestic tasks to produce a unit of a good. Thus, domestic labor demand
falls. The output effect increases domestic labor demand by generating productivity
gains via cost-savings. The substitution effect first reflects the substitution between the
high-skill factor and the low-skill factor (factor substitution) and second within the low-
skill factor the substitution between domestic tasks and foreign tasks (task substitution).
While the factor substitution has a positive effect on domestic low-skill employment (and
a negative on high skill home employment), task substitution has a negative effect on
low-income employment at home. The displacement and the output effect identified by
Wright (2013) are closely related to the effects described in earlier literature discussed
above.
Summing up, theory comes up with different channels and opposing effects of FDI
on home employment. Two channels seem to be important in all models and for both
types of FDI: the direct displacement effect and the indirect output or productivity
effect. These two channels have opposing effects on home employment and theory is not
able to predict which will be the dominating channel. Hence, the theory does not come
to a clear conclusion as to whether outward FDI lead to a loss or gain of jobs in the
home country. It is important to keep in mind, that the motivation for FDI is decisive
in order to investigate the effects on employment, because HFDI and VFDI do affect
employment via different mechanisms. Therefore, these different investment types might
have distinct effects on domestic labor demand.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Baseline Specification
As outlined in the previous section two opposing channels explain the relation between
domestic and foreign employment. Following Wright (2013), we estimate these two
channels in two separate steps reflected in these estimation equations:
lnEmplDit = α























where Equation 1 estimates the displacement effect and Equation 2 the output effect.
EmplDit is domestic labor of the MNE i and Empl
F
it is the number of employees working
abroad. Yit is output measured in net revenue. We control for a set of additional firm
specific variables Xit (exports, imports and capital). We do not have access to export
and import data on firm level, they are constructed on industry level.6 Moreover, we
substitution effect on employment and does not focus on this channel.
6Firm-fixed effects ensure that time-invariant level differences are absorbed. This means that only
the change of exports and imports over time is relevant. Including exports and imports on industry-level
is therefore based on the assumption that imports and exports of a MNE develop in the same way as
the average of its industry.
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include year (δt) and firm fixed effects (γi).
In the first step, we estimate the displacement effect, which quantifies the direct effect
of offshoring, where domestic workers are replaced by foreign workers. Therefore, home
employment EmplDit is regressed on lagged foreign workers Empl
F
it−1 (see Equation 1). As
discussed in Section 2, home employment is as well affected by foreign employment via an
opposing indirect effect. This indirect channel affects home employment via firm output.
In order to isolate the displacement effect in Equation 1, we have to cancel this output
channel out. As Wright (2013), we are doing this by holding output fix, i.e. by controlling
for output Yit−1. When output is fixed, foreign and home employment are substitutes
and more foreign employment means less employment at home. Consequently, we expect
the displacement effect to be negative. Because the labor market is not fully flexible, it
takes time until a dismissal or hiring of staff realizes. Therefore, both EmplFit and Yit
are lagged by one year.
In a second step, we estimate the output effect. As discussed in Section 2, the output
effect is an indirect effect which works via cost savings and an increase in production.
Therefore, we need to estimate the output effect in two steps. We estimate the effect
of outward FDI on total output (see Equation 2). Again, we lag EmplFit , because it
takes time until the opening of a new foreign affiliate affects output. However, a sig-
nificant effect of foreign employment on output in Equation 2 is not sufficient to show
that the output channel exists. The output effect channel consists of two parts: The
effect of foreign employment on output on the one hand and the effect of output on
home employment on the other. With Equation 2, only the first part of this channel is
established. Hence, in order to fully capture the output effect channel, we need to show
as well that the effect of output on home employment in Equation 1 is significant (and
positive). Accordingly, the indirect effect of outward FDI on home employment is only
given if both – the effect of outward FDI on output and the effect of output on home
employment – can be substantiated. The overall effect of FDI on domestic employment
is finally identified by adding up the coefficients from estimating the displacement and
the output effect.
By applying a fixed effects model, we control for time-invariant and firm-specific
variation, however, there might exist time-variant firm-specific variables that are not
observed. One example for time-variant unobserved variables are technology shocks
which are absorbed in the error term but affect domestic and foreign employment. This
could cause endogeneity issues, which we face by adopting an instrumental variable
strategy.
3.2 Instrumental Variable Strategy
We are proposing a novel instrument for firm-level outward FDI. We construct the po-
tential foreign employment for each firm using only exogenous FDI predictors. Our
approach is similar to the strategy used in Desai, Foley and Hines (2009) and the grav-
ity based technique often used in the trade literature (see e.g. Santos Silva and Tenreyro,
2006). Desai, Foley and Hines (2009) construct firm-specific weighted averages of for-
eign GDP growth as predictor for foreign activity of that firm. The predicted growth
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rates of foreign activity are then employed to explain changes in domestic activity. The
idea behind the instrument is that FDI locations differ significantly between firms and
these locations are exposed to different exogenous developments (in Desai, Foley and
Hines, 2009, different GDP growth rates) which affect FDI positions. Part of our ar-
gument is very similar: We know that FDI destination countries of Swiss MNEs differ
significantly across firms. Given these locations, we can observe exogenous and country-
specific shocks, which affect FDI choices of Swiss MNEs. Let us for example assume that
one firm’s investments are concentrated in Germany, while the other firm’s investments
are concentrated in the United Kingdom (UK). The firm which is operating in Germany
is more exposed to shocks in Germany than the other firm. Hence, a positive shock in
Germany is – at least in the short term – supposed to have a bigger positive impact
on foreign activities of the firm with mostly German operations. As predictors of these
shocks we take inward FDI stock of country c minus Swiss outward FDI stock into the
same country c, the exchange rate between the US-Dollar (USD) and country c′s cur-
rency, as well as other variables described below which have been shown to be important
exogenous predictors of FDI flows in the gravity literature (e.g. in Carr, Markusen and
Maskus, 2001; Head, Mayer and Ries, 2009; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004). We take
inward FDI stocks as predictor since Swiss MNEs are highly likely to invest in those
countries, where MNEs of other countries decide to invest. The idea behind the ex-
change rate is the following: If there are again two firms, one with affiliates mostly in
Germany and the other in the UK and the Euro depreciates, German employees become
relatively cheaper and firms which have already affiliates in Germany will expand foreign
activities relatively more than the firm, whose affiliates are concentrated in the UK.7
A challenge is that we observe all the predictors of outward FDI on country level.
However, we need firm-specific predictions of foreign employment based on the exogenous
predictors named above. We apply the approach of di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009)
to overcome this problem. The goal is to predict firm-specific foreign employment in a
zero-stage in these three steps:




ctβi + εict (3)
̂Log Empl
f














Log Emplfict is the log of foreign employment of firm i in country c and year t.
FDI∗ct is total inward FDI stock of country c subtracted by the outward FDI stock of
Switzerland (CH) in country c (FDIct − FDICHct ). Xct is a set of exogenous predictors
of FDI as exchange rate between the USD and foreign country c’s currency, population
(log), capital-labor ratio, investment and trade costs (log), distance from Switzerland to
7We take the USD dollar as base currency, because fluctuations in the Swiss franc exchange rate of
the Swiss franc are likely to be caused by events that affect the performance of Swiss firms.
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c (log), dummy variable for existing investment treaties between Switzerland and c and
a dummy variable for common language.8
The key of the approach is the first step, i.e. estimation Equation 3. Following
di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009), we regress firm-level foreign employment on country-
specific predictors to get firm-specific coefficients βi, i.e. we run regression Equation 3 for
each firm i. We get different firm-specific coefficients, because firms might follow different
foreign investment strategies. Firm-specific investment strategies might address different
host-countries, be more or less sensitive to different predictors and change over time. For
example, capital-labor ratio might be more important for some firms than for others,
depending on the investment strategy and the production function of the firms. In a
second step, we predict potential foreign employment per country, Êmpl
f
ict, based on
exogenous predictors of Estimation 3. Hence, we keep only the exogenous variation of
foreign employment, while the endogenous part in the error term is left out. In a final
step, we compute the total potential foreign employment per firm by summing up the
exponential of the predicted log of country-specific foreign employment over all countries
for each firm (see Equation 5).9 Having predicted potential foreign employment Êmplfit,
we apply a 2SLS strategy to estimate Equations 1 and 2 using Êmplfit as instrument.
Since firms have affiliates and therefore positive numbers of foreign employment only
in a few countries, they report a lot of zeros for most other countries. This implies that
we have to deal with many zero values which would get lost when taking logs. These zero
values contain important information in order to consistently estimate the coefficients
in Equation 3 and allow us to consider cases were firms open up new plants in a foreign
country. We face this issue by following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and use the
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator in order to estimate Equation 3.
4 Data
The main data source on multinational activities of Swiss Firms are the surveys on cross-
border capital linkages from the SNB which covers basically firms with a FDI balance
sheet lager than 10 million Swiss Francs (CHF). Our data include domestic and foreign
employment on a country level of Swiss multinational enterprises over the period 1994-
2016. It also covers data on firm characteristics such as industry classification (3-digit
NOGA code) and ownership as well as extensive information on domestic and foreign
capital links of the firms. To get access to firm-level data we were obliged to obtain
8Note that the exogenous predictors named above should not affect home employment of a Swiss
firm via any other channel than foreign employment. Therefore, it is important that we include time
fixed effects: These time fixed effects absorb global shocks (e.g. a downturn in global economy) that
may affect predictors (e.g. FDI∗ct) as well as Swiss firms directly. Furthermore, it is important to keep
in mind that we control for trade (import and export) such that predictors (e.g. distance between a
country and Switzerland or population size) only affect home employment of a Swiss-based firm via FDI.
9In order to get the absolute total of potential foreign employment, we need to sum the exponential
because the PPML estimator returns logarithmized results of potential foreign employment per firm and
country.
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the consent of the respective firms due to confidentiality issues and the data protection
rule of the SNB. We got access to data of 139 firms. Our sample covers around 56% of
all domestic employees working for Swiss MNEs. Further data on firm characteristics
such as net revenues and property, plants, equipment (called capital) were extracted
from Worldscope, Thomson Reuter’s Datastream. The remaining missing data on firm
characteristics were finally gathered through access to historical annual reports by the
Swiss Economics Archive (Schweizerisches Wirtschaftsarchiv). However, we were not
able to fill all the missing values for variables on firm characteristics. Exports and
imports are obtained from UN Comtrade Database for trade in goods and from the
SNB10 for trade in service.
We further assemble data on FDI predictors in order to construct our instrumental
variable (see Section 3.2). We obtain data on distance between Switzerland and a cer-
tain destination, population size and information on common language from the CEPII
gravity database.11 Data on investment costs (Global Competitiveness Index, GCI), ex-
change rates, capital-labour ratio and bilateral trade costs are retrieved from the World
Bank database. Data on FDI stocks and information on bilateral investment treaties are
gathered from UNCTAD and information on preferential trade arrangements between
countries including WTO-investment-areas are provided by Word Bank.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Characteristics of Swiss multinationals
Minimum Median Mean Maximum
Home Employment 109 1434 4361 53,201
Foreign Employment 9 2390 14,021 275,947
Revenue (in Mio. CHF) 43 2005 7698 95,902
Capital (in Mio. CHF) 17 409 7733 404,094
Countries per firm 1 36 45 124
Employment per Affiliate 1 94 592 56,288
Our panel is highly unbalanced with hardly any values for the years before 2002.
Due to modification of the methodical concepts in 201412 and limited availability of
other data used, we are finally left with a sample covering the period 2002-2013. The
data include firms in manufacturing as well as service (including banks and insurance
companies). Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the firm characteristics. The size
10Database can be accessed via https://data.snb.ch/en.
11Database can be accessed via cepii.fr.
12Until 2013 staff numbers included both minority and majority participations and were stated in
relation to the capital participation of the investor. As of 2014 – in line with international methodology
– staff numbers only include majority participations. Further, no longer proportional, but absolute
numbers of staff abroad are stated.
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of the MNEs vary considerably in our sample. A few firms operate mainly globally
and report high values of foreign employment while others operate mainly domestically.
I.e. the number of workers employed in Switzerland varies between 109 and 53,201 per
firm and the number of workers abroad between 9 and 275,947. The average firm in
the dataset has about 4,361 domestic employees and 14,021 employees working abroad.
Furthermore, firms in our dataset have an affiliate in at least one country and on average
in 46 countries. The affiliate size ranges from 1 employee to a maximum of about 56,000
employees with an average of 592 employees. The median firm has affiliates in 36 different
countries with a median size of 94 employees.
Table 2 Employment by Destination
2002 2013
Domestic employment 223,482 429,080
Total foreign employment 907,752 1,283,284
Employment in high-income countries 627,047 672,839
Share of foreign empl. in high-income 69% 52%
Employment in upper middle-income countries 71,358 130,305
Share of foreign empl. in upper middle-income 8% 10%
Employment in lower middle-income countries 166,575 368,167
Share of foreign empl. in lower middle-income 18% 29%
Employment in low-income countries 42,773 111,972
Share of foreign empl. in low-income 5% 9%
Note: Grouping into income categories according to World Bank classification in 2002.
Table 2 reports total number of domestic employment and employment in foreign
countries aggregated over all firms classified in income-level aggregates. We split em-
ployment in foreign affiliates according to the country’s income level in high-, upper
middle-, lower middle- and low-income. The classification is done according to the World
Bank income classification of 2002. While Swiss MNEs located their affiliates mostly
in high-income countries in 2002 (69% of all foreign employees were engaged by then
in high-income countries) lower middle-income and low-income countries have gained
importance as destination market for foreign investments in the last decade. During the
wave of globalization especially countries like China and India, which are classified as
lower middle-income or low-income countries, became increasingly more attractive for
foreign investment. These two countries are the main driver of the rise in employment in
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the lower middle-income and low-income country aggregates.13 In the period observed,
foreign employment increased in high-income countries by almost 12%, while it more
than doubled in lower middle- and low-income countries. These findings are well aligned
with global FDI patterns: Almost all FDI in the 1990s took place between high-income
countries and tended consequently to be HFDI, but VFDI have become increasingly im-
portant in recent decades (Barba Navaretti, Venables and Barry, 2006, p.32). Figure A.1
in Appendix A displays the ten most important destination countries in terms of foreign
employment for Switzerland. In 2002 the US and Germany were clearly the most impor-
tant destination countries followed by other major economies in Europe as the United
Kingdom and France. Further behind, large emerging countries like Brazil, Russia and
China were following as well as other major European economies as the UK, Italy and
Spain. Over the last decade major emerging economies such as China, Brazil and India
became more important countries for outward FDI. In 2013, China was as important as
Germany for Swiss multinationals while the US remained the main destination of FDI
in terms of employment in foreign affiliates.
We need to drop a number of firms from our sample due to several reasons. First,
we drop firms which never have a non-zero observation in foreign employment (34 firms
never have a non-missing or non-zero value). Second, we drop Swiss-based subsidiary
companies of foreign corporations and consider only corporations headquartered in and
directed from Switzerland. Thirdly, we drop firms for which the PPML-estimation does
not converge, because we are not able to predict potential foreign employment reliably (8
firms). Finally, we have to drop one or two firms in each estimation, because the instru-




Table 3 reports the results of estimating Equation 1 quantifying the displacement effect.
Models in columns 1-3 are estimated with the fixed effects estimation approach, while
models in columns 4-6 show the results of the IV estimation within a 2SLS framework.
The results in column 1 show that there is no significant correlation between domestic
and foreign employment, when we do only control for firm and year fixed effects. Since we
expect a negative displacement and a positive output effect to be at work, which might
outweigh each other, this result is not meaningful. Therefore, we control for output in
the regression in order to isolate the displacement channel. By doing so, the effect of
13India was classified as low-income country until 2009 and is, therefore, included in our low-income
aggregate.
14 These one or two outliers cause a drop of the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic of our 2SLS
prediction to below 1 from a convienent value of clearly more than the critical 10. We indicate for each
estimation, how many firms had to be dropped because of outliers. Usually, a small bank with very
few employees at home and abroad is dropped, as well as a firm in the energy sector. Fixed effects
estimations show that estimates are otherwise not sensible to the inclusion or exclusion of these firms.
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foreign employment becomes, as expected negative and significant (see columns 2-3).
An increase of foreign employment of 10% would lead to a decrease of domestic within
firm employment of 1%. This is in line with the theory and the underlying concept of
the estimation strategy. We control for capital, exports and imports in order to capture
changes in capital intensity and trade-related movements. These additional controls do
not alter the coefficient of interest.
To cope with potential endogeneity issues, we instrument foreign employment as
described in Section 3. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics of the first stage show that our
instrument is relevant. Using instrumented foreign employment, the displacement effect
disappears completely (columns 5-6): The coefficient of interest becomes insignificant
and is close to zero. Only output seems to be relevant and is positively associated with
domestic employment. However, the coefficient of output loses significance, as soon as
we control for capital, exports and imports.
In a second step we estimate the output effect, which represents the indirect pro-
ductivity effect from offshoring on domestic employment. We have discussed in Section
2 that we need two steps to fully substantiate the output effect: The effect of foreign
employment on output and, additionally, the effect of output on home employment is ex-
pected to be positive. First, we consider the effect of foreign employment on output. In
order to do that we estimate Equation 2 by using the same instrument as in Equation 1
for foreign employment. Results are reported in Table 4. We find a highly significant and
Table 3 Displacement Effect
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Home Empl. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.01 =0.09∗∗∗ =0.10∗∗∗ 0.22 0.06 0.04
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.21) (0.27) (0.29)
Lag Output (log) 0.47∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.35∗ 0.29
(0.13) (0.12) (0.20) (0.23)
Capital (log) 0.08 0.08
(0.07) (0.09)
Exports (log) 0.09 0.10
(0.18) (0.20)
Imports (log) =0.04 =0.01
(0.08) (0.15)
Observations 557 557 557 557 557 557
First stage F-stat. 34.26 19.05 18.21
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. (10,000 iterations) for
columns 4–6. Two firms have been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote 14.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4 Output Effect
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Output (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.24∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13)
Capital (log) 0.15∗ 0.12
(0.08) (0.08)
Exports (log) 0.34∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗
(0.12) (0.11)
Imports (log) 0.01 0.06
(0.08) (0.11)
Observations 557 557 557 557
First stage F-stat. 34.26 29.08
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. (10,000 iterations) for
columns 3–4. Two firms have been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote 14.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
positive association between foreign employment and output. The estimate in column
4 indicates that an increase in foreign employment by 10% is associated with a rise in
output of 3.8%. Hence, the first part of the output effect channel is established: Higher
foreign employment is significantly and positively associated with output. Results in
Table 3 show that the evidence of the second part of the output channel – whether
output is positively associated with domestic employment – is less clear. Output is on
the one hand positively and significantly correlated with home employment when we
are not including capital and trade (column 5). But on the other hand, the IV point
estimates of output become marginally smaller if we include all controls and bootstrap
standard errors get inflated. Therefore, the IV estimates of the relation between output
and domestic employment remain positive but turn insignificant in column 6. Hence,
we do not find clear evidence of the second part of the output channel. However, results
point toward the existence of such a positive output channel.
Summing up, we find that the negative displacement effect seems to be irrelevant
when using the IV approach, while it depends on the model whether we find a positive
output effect. Hence, outward FDI appear not to have an important effect on home
employment when considering all types of FDI. As mentioned, depending on the FDI
strategy of a firm different mechanisms might be at work and considering all types of
FDI in one estimation might not allow to disentangle these different effects. Further, in
2002 about 70% of all Swiss outward FDI flow to other high-income countries and are
therefore, mainly HFDI. Even though middle- and low-income countries gain importance
over time, high-income countries remain the primary destination of outward FDI of
Swiss MNEs. As discussed in Section 2, HFDI substitute domestic exports. However,
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if exports to a certain country were low or zero before firms conduct HFDI in that
country, there are not much exports to be substituted and thereby the displacement
effect is small or nonexistent. Hence, an explanation why there seems not to exist
a clear displacement effect in Switzerland, might be the investment strategy of Swiss
firms seeking to open (new) markets. The small domestic market and potentially higher
transport costs due to the lack of sea access, may further explain why Swiss MNEs are
opening up affiliates overseas primarily in order to gain market access. In order to further
investigate and disentangle the effects of different types of FDI on home employment,
we need to distinguish between vertical and horizontal outward FDI. This is done in the
following Section.
5.2 FDI by Destination
The distinction between VFDI and HFDI is crucial in determining the displacement
and the output effect. While VFDI are motivated by making use of wage differentials
and cost savings, market seeking and technology sourcing are main objectives of HFDI.
Therefore, the mechanisms at work are different and effects of the respective type of
outward FDI might be different.
A crude measure to differentiate between the types of FDI is by looking at destination
countries and classify investments to lower-income countries as VFDI and to high-income
countries as HFDI.15 This distinction by income levels is based on the idea that wages
are lower in low-income countries and therefore, they are more attractive for VFDI.
Furthermore, purchasing power is below average and the market is less attractive to sell
products. In high-income countries, on the other hand, purchase power is high and the
technology closer to the frontier, which is important for market seeking or technology
sourcing and therefore HFDI. We incorporate this distinction between VFDI and HFDI
by splitting countries to high-, upper resp. lower middle- and low-income countries
according to the World Bank classification in the year 2002.
5.2.1 FDI to High-Income Countries
In a first step, we focus on FDI to high-income countries. This means, we run the
zero stage (Equations 3-5) as well as estimations of the displacement and output effect
considering only foreign employment in high-income countries. Figure A.2 in Appendix
A shows the share of employment in the 10 most important high-income destinations.
In 2002 the USA was clearly the most important destination followed by Germany and
further behind other major European economies as the United Kingdom, France or
Italy. The most salient change in 2013 compared to 2002 is that very distant countries
like Canada, Japan and Australia seem to become more important destinations. As
mentioned above, we expect most of these FDI to be HFDI.
The regression results for the effect of investing to high-income countries and there-
fore performing HFDI are shown in Tables 5 and 6. The Kleibergen-Papp F-statistics of
15This link between type of FDI and destination country is, for instance, as well done in Harrison
and McMillan (2011) and Debaere, Lee and Lee (2010)
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Table 5 Displacement Effect for FDI into high-income countries
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Home Empl. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.04 =0.05 =0.05 0.15 0.03 0.01
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Lag Output (log) 0.43∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15)
Capital (log) 0.08 0.08
(0.07) (0.08)
Exports (log) 0.10 0.09
(0.18) (0.19)
Imports (log) =0.02 =0.02
(0.08) (0.13)
Observations 553 553 553 553 553 553
First stage F-stat. 37.00 25.28 26.00
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. (10,000 iterations) for
columns 4–6. Two firms have been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote 14.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
the first stage of our estimations are much higher compared to the values in the baseline
regressions including all types of FDI and show that our instrument is relevant. Com-
pared to the baseline results in Table 3, the magnitude of the displacement effect in the
fixed effects approach is cut in half and is not significant anymore (see columns 2-3 in
Table 5). The results of the IV strategy show a similar pattern as in the baseline regres-
sion: Point estimates of foreign employment in Table 5 are close to zero and clearly not
significant. Hence, we do not find any evidence of the negative displacement channel.
On the other hand, foreign employment is positively and significantly associated with
output (see Table 6) and output is positively and significantly associated with home
employment (see Table 5). There is significant evidence of the existence of both steps of
the output effect. Therefore, outward FDI to high-income countries stimulate domestic
employment – even though the effect is rather small. A simple combination of both steps
of the output effect as in Wright (2013) gives us the following overall effect: An increase
of foreign employment by 10% is associated with an increase of home employment of
about 0.9% (including all controls) to 1.3% (excluding capital and trade controls) via the
output channel. Since results in this sections show that HFDI do not substitute exports
(i.e. there is no displacement effect), one might conclude that the main motivation of
outward FDI in Switzerland is opening new markets or technology sourcing.
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Table 6 Output Effect for FDI into high-income countries
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Output (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.24∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08)
Capital (log) 0.15∗ 0.12
(0.07) (0.08)
Exports (log) 0.32∗∗ 0.27∗∗
(0.12) (0.12)
Imports (log) =0.02 0.00
(0.07) (0.12)
Observations 553 553 553 553
First stage F-stat. 37.00 35.64
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. (10,000 iterations) for
columns 3–4. Two firms have been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote 14.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
5.2.2 FDI to Upper Middle-Income Countries
Our instrument is not valid for this category of FDI (see Kleibergen-Papp F-statistics of
the first stage in Tables B.1 and B.2). Therefore, we refrain from discussing the results.
Nevertheless, the results can be found in Appendix B.
Reasons why we fail to reliably estimate the effect in this case, might be that the
upper-middle income group is a relatively small group of heterogeneous countries and
overall only a relatively small number of Swiss MNE employees is active in these coun-
tries. In total, Swiss MNEs in our sample are active in only 23 upper middle-income
countries, which makes the upper middle-income economies the smallest category in
terms of number of destinations. Figure A.3 in Appendix A shows that these are mostly
Eastern European or Latin American destinations. Compared to the most important
countries of other categories these are relatively small economies. With a share of 8% of
total foreign employment in 2002 and no country in the top ten destinations for Swiss
MNE upper middle-income countries are less important as destination for Swiss MNE
than high-income or lower middle-income countries.
5.2.3 FDI to Lower Middle-Income Countries
Lower middle-income countries are with a share of 18% in 2002 and 29% in 2013 the most
important destination for Swiss outward FDI after high-income countries. Figure A.4 in
Appendix A shows that most important lower middle-income destination countries are
big emerging markets outside of Europe as Brazil, Russia or China. These three large
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Table 7 Displacement Effect for FDI into lower middle-income countries
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Home Empl. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag For. Empl. (log) =0.08∗ =0.11∗∗ =0.11∗∗ =0.11 =0.17∗ =0.16∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Lag Output (log) 0.31∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.14)
Capital (log) 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.13)
Exports (log) 0.17 0.13
(0.25) (0.27)
Imports (log) =0.07 =0.07
(0.14) (0.35)
Observations 386 386 386 386 386 386
First stage F-stat. 27.42 23.17 26.51
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. (10,000 iterations)
for columns 4–6. One firm has been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote 14.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
emerging markets also belong to the most important destinations for Switzerland when
considering all destinations. Due to the high wage level in Switzerland, lower-middle-
income countries might mainly be of interest for VFDI for Swiss MNE. However, some of
these countries such as China, Brazil and Russia might be as well interesting for HFDI,
because of their market size and increasing purchase power (at least during the period
observed).
Tables 7 and 8 show the results of FDI to lower middle-income countries. In contrast
to our findings of overall FDI and FDI to high-income countries, we find evidence of a
negative displacement effect in the IV model (columns 5 and 6 in Table 7). IV estimates
show that an increase of foreign employment in lower middle-income countries by 10%
is associated with a significant decrease of employment at home by 1.6%. Furthermore,
there is evidence for the positive output effect: Foreign employment is positively and
significantly associated with output (see Table 8), while output is positively associated
with home employment (see Table 7). When we are combining the effects as it is done in
Wright (2013), we find that overall an increase in foreign employment in lower middle-
income countries by 10% is associated with a decrease of home employment by about
1.1%. Hence, the negative displacement effect outweighs the positive output effect in
this case.
So, while overall FDI and in particular FDI to high-income countries tend to have
a positive effect on home employment, FDI to lower middle-income countries seem to
decrease home employment in the short-run. Hence, the different mechanics behind
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Table 8 Output Effect for FDI into lower middle-income countries
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Output (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.13∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.17∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Capital (log) 0.13 0.12
(0.11) (0.15)
Exports (log) 0.41∗∗ 0.44∗
(0.17) (0.23)
Imports (log) 0.01 0.01
(0.20) (0.36)
Observations 386 386 386 386
First stage F-stat. 27.42 30.19
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1-2 and bootstrap std. err. (10,000 iterations) for
columns 3–4. One firm has been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote 14.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
HFDI and VFDI actually do affect home employment differently: While the positive
output effect dominates for HFDI, the negative output effect is dominating for VFDI to
lower middle-income countries.
5.2.4 FDI to Low-Income Countries
Ultimately, we look at FDI to low-income countries. Figure A.5 in Appendix A shows
that almost 40% of foreign employees in low-income countries are located in India. Other
important low-income destination countries are Zambia, Indonesia or Pakistan. Due
to the low purchase power, most of these countries do not seem to be interesting for
HFDI.16 Moreover, low-income countries are generally not at the technological frontier
and therefore, technology sourcing is as well unlikely to be the motivation behind FDI
to these countries. Wage differentials seem to be the main motivation behind FDI in
these countries. Furthermore, countries with unstable political institutions and very
low purchase power but rich in natural resources as the Democratic Republic of Congo
seem to be attractive destinations because of their natural resources and not because
of low wages and cost-savings in production. Hence, it is not likely that production
stages from Switzerland will be shifted to countries with very low incomes but rich in
natural resources. The goal behind FDI to these countries is rather natural resource
sourcing than a substitution of Swiss production. Thus, FDI to low-income countries
16Countries like India or Indonesia could of course be as well interesting for HFDI because of their
market size and rapidly growing middle-class. However, HFDI are overall rather the exception, while
VFDI are the prevailing FDI type flowing to these type of countries.
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Table 9 Displacement Effect for FDI into low-income countries
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Home Empl. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag For. Empl. (log) =0.09 =0.12∗ =0.09 0.02 =0.05 0.03
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.13) (0.11) (0.21)
Lag Output (log) 0.27∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.12
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.15)
Capital (log) =0.04 =0.02
(0.03) (0.15)
Exports (log) 0.58∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗
(0.20) (0.37)
Imports (log) 0.00 0.06
(0.10) (0.34)
Observations 250 250 250 250 250 250
First stage F-stat. 88.46 93.86 49.20
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. (10,000 iterations)
for columns 4–6.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
appear to be heterogeneous and it is not clear what the prevailing motivation behind
FDI to low-income countries is. Further, it is important to know, that only very few
Swiss firms open up relatively large affiliates in these countries. In 2013 only 54 firms
of 103 in the data have affiliates in low-income countries, while 100 of 103 firms in the
data have affiliates in high-income countries.
Tables 9 and 10 present the results of the estimations considering only FDI to low-
income countries. The results might be compared to the results found in the benchmark
estimations in Table 3 and 4: The displacement effect disappears completely as soon as
we instrument foreign employment. The point estimate is again close to zero and clearly
not significant (see Table 9). On the other hand, we find a positive association between
foreign employment and output for the fixed effects approach and for the IV approach
(see Table 10). Output tends to be positively associated with domestic employment,
although the positive association is not significant when including all control variables
(see column 6 in Table 9). So, in the case of FDI to low-income countries we do not find
evidence of a negative displacement effect and we find only weak evidence of a positive
output effect. Similarly as for the estimation with upper middle-income countries, this
lack of significance might be attributed to the limited number of observations, but also
to the heterogeneity of countries in our low-income sample. On the one hand the data
covers foreign employment in countries with large market size such as India and Indonesia
which are interesting for VFDI (and HFDI), on the other hand it also includes countries
rich in natural resources (e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, etc.), which are
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Table 10 Output Effect for FDI into low-income countries
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Output (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.14∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.27∗ 0.30∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.15) (0.13)
Capital (log) 0.14 0.16
(0.13) (0.23)
Exports (log) 0.76∗∗ 0.87∗
(0.37) (0.51)
Imports (log) 0.10 0.18
(0.13) (0.42)
Observations 250 250 250 250
First stage F-stat. 88.46 62.10
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. (10,000 iterations)
for columns 3–4.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
rather interesting for resource sourcing instead of production for MNEs.
5.3 Robustness Checks
In Section 5.2 we have grouped the countries into different income categories according
to the World Bank definition from 2002. We have used this classification as a rough
measure to classify the FDI into HFDI and VFDI. However, results discussed before
could be driven by large destination countries or particularities of the classification itself.
Therefore, we run two different robustness checks for each destination category, except
for the upper middle-income group, where we were not able to estimate benchmark
results reliably with the data at hand.
First, we exclude dominant countries that might drive the results. In the case of FDI
to high-income countries we exclude the US with a share of almost 30% of the foreign
employees in high-income countries. In the case of lower-middle income countries we
exclude China with a share of 35% in 2013 and in the case of low-income countries we
drop India with a share of almost 40% in 2013.
Second, we re-run the whole estimation by destination group using the classification
of the World Bank in the year 2013 instead of 2002. Many countries changed the in-
come group until 2013 (see Table D.1 in Appendix D for an overview) and therefore,
this robustness check allows us to test whether results found in Section 5.2 stem from
particularities of the classification.
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5.3.1 Robustness Check: Drop Dominant Destinations
In a first robustness check we drop the US as dominant destination in the high-income
group. Results in Tables C.1 and C.2 in Appendix C.1 show that the exclusion of the
USA does not importantly change the results: We still do not find any evidence of the
displacement effect when instrumenting for foreign employment (columns 5 and 6 in
Table C.1), but – as in the benchmark results – we find evidence for both steps of the
positive output effect.
In a second robustness check we drop China as the dominant destination in the lower
middle-income group (see Tables C.5 and C.6 in Appendix C.3). Dropping China alters
the results completely. The negative displacement effect disappears: Points estimates
are small and insignificant. While there is still significant evidence for the first step of
the output effect (Table C.6), there is no evidence for the second step anymore: Point
estimates of the second step are cut in half and not significant anymore (Table C.5
columns 5 and 6). So, it appears that the negative overall effect of FDI to lower-middle
income countries found in the benchmark estimations is driven by China and disappears
completely as soon as China is excluded.
In a third robustness check India as the dominant destination of the low-income
group is dropped. Tables C.9 and C.5 in Appendix C.5 show that the results found in
the benchmark estimation for low-income countries heavily depend on India: Not only
does the instrument lose its relevance (Kleibergen-Papp F-statistics of the first stage are
consistently below the value of 5), but we do not find any evidence for the displacement
or output effect anymore.
In conclusion, results for lower middle- and low-income destination are driven by
single dominant countries and not robust when these countries are dropped. However,
the positive effect of FDI to high-income destination is robust when dropping the US as
dominant destination.
5.3.2 Robustness Check: Income Classification of 2013
In this section we re-estimate the regressions by income level classification of 2013 instead
of 2002. Table D.1 in Appendix D shows to which income group countries belonged in
2002 and 2013. Tables C.3 and C.4 in Appendix C.2 show the effect of FDI to high-
income countries according to the classification of 2013. Point estimates remain very
similar to the benchmark estimation. The only remarkable difference to the benchmark
results is that the second part of the output effect loses significance when all controls
are included (see Table C.3 column 6).
Considering the robustness check of the lower middle-income category, it is important
to know that seven of the ten most important lower middle-income countries in 2002 were
classified either as upper middle- or high-income countries in 2012. Most importantly,
China - which is driving the results in the benchmark estimation - as well as Brazil
and Russia switched from being classified as lower-middle income countries in 2002
to upper-middle income countries in 2013. On the other hand, many important low-
income destinations are classified as lower middle-income countries in 2013. In particular,
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India is classified as a lower-middle income country since 2009. Tables C.7 and C.8 in
Appendix C.4 present the results using the 2013 classification. We find no evidence
for the negative displacement effect. Results show further that foreign employment is
positively associated with output (see Table C.8 columns 3 and 4). Hence, we find
evidence for the first part of the output effect. Finally, it depends on the specification
whether we find evidence for the second part of the output effect (see Table C.7): We
only find a positive and significant association between output and home employment
in columns 5 but not when we include all covariates in column 6. Hence, as soon as
we are considering the classification of 2013 the effect of FDI to lower middle-income
countries changes from negative to (tendentiously) positive. This is no surprise, since
most important lower middle-income destinations of 2002 became upper middle-income
countries, while most important low-income destinations moved up to the lower middle-
income category. So, the results we are finding in this robustness check is very similar
to the results of the benchmark estimation of the low-income category. However, this
robustness check shows that results are sensitive to the classification of countries.
In the case of low-income countries, many important countries moved up to the
lower middle-income group. Most importantly India, that was driving the results in the
benchmark estimations, but in total eight of the ten most important destinations in 2002
were classified as lower middle-income countries in 2013. Consequently, observations
drop to 100 and it is not surprising that we do not find any significant results (see
Tables C.11 and C.12 in Appendix C.6).
In conclusion, robustness tests show that the positive effect found for high-income
countries is fairly robust: Results do not change much if the dominant country is dropped
nor if the income classification of 2013 is used. However, effects found for all other income
levels do not seem to be robust and heavily depend on single dominant countries or the
year of the classification. In particular, it becomes apparent that the negative effect
found for lower middle-income countries is only driven by China (which is comparable
to the finding of Debaere, Lee and Lee (2010) for South Korea).
6 Conclusion
Economic theory suggests that there are negative as well as positive effects of offshoring
on domestic labor demand. However, theory is not able to predict clearly, whether
positive effects are able to offset negative effects. Empirical work does not come to a
clear conclusion either: Results depend on the context of the country observed and on the
type and destination of FDI. We use firm-level data containing firms of the manufacturing
and the service sector in order to examine the effect of offshoring on home employment
in the case of Switzerland, a small economy with relatively high outward FDI stock.
We find that it is crucial to distinguish between different types of FDI. Using fixed
effects and an instrumental variable approach we find no evidence of the negative dis-
placement effect, but a positive and significant output effect of FDI to high-income
countries (i.e. mainly HFDI). On the other hand we find a significant and negative dis-
placement effect which outweighs the positive output effect in the case of FDI to lower
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middle-income countries (i.e. mainly VFDI). However, while the positive effect found
for FDI to high-income countries is robust, the effect of FDI to lower-middle income
countries is driven by China and disappears as soon as China is excluded. Further, it is
important to keep in mind that these positive short-run effects of HFDI and negative ef-
fects of VFDI are rather moderate. We find no evidence of a negative displacement effect
when we are considering the IV results of FDI to all countries and only to low-income
countries. For both – FDI to all countries and only to low-income countries – results
point toward to a positive output and, hence, overall effect. However, the effect of FDI
to low-income countries is driven by single dominating destinations and not robust to
changes in the income classification definitions.
Summing up, Swiss outward FDI stock and flows are tremendous in relative size,
but do barely affect total domestic jobs within firms. If so, there seems to be rather a
positive effect than a negative. It is important to keep in mind that the goal of this paper
is to estimate the overall effect of outward FDI on home employment and that effects
might be very different between low- and high-skilled labor (see e.g. Wright, 2013).
A reason why the displacement effect does not seem to exist in Switzerland might
be, that Swiss MNEs follow a HFDI strategy and primarily invest in other high-income
countries. HFDI seem to stimulate total domestic jobs, although the magnitude of the
effect is rather small. So, we are concluding that outward FDI do not endanger the total
number of domestic jobs in the case of Switzerland – on the contrary they seem to create
jobs, especially if the MNE is investing into another high-income country. Although
there is a trend to more outward FDI into upper middle- but more importantly lower
middle- and low-income countries, the majority of Swiss outward FDI still flows into
other high-income countries.
There are limitations in comparing our results with other existing evidence given
the different estimation strategy and underlying data. Our approach is most related to
Desai, Foley and Hines (2009), who find positive effects of foreign activity of US MNEs
on domestic employment. Harrison and McMillan (2011) present evidence of different
effects given the destination country and the tasks performed abroad, where investments
to low-income country is associated with lower domestic employment, while they find
positive effects of FDI into high-income countries. Wright (2013) finds as well a slightly
positive overall effect. However, he examines as well the effect on low skilled labor,
where he finds a negative effect. Hijzen, Jean and Mayer (2011) and Debaere, Lee and
Lee (2010) pursue a different empirical approach but find similar effects. Hijzen, Jean
and Mayer (2011) find positive effects of HFDI and no effects of VFDI in France, while
Debaere, Lee and Lee (2010) find negative effects of FDI in lower-income countries and
positive effects on employment of FDI to higher-income countries for South Korea.
Finally, it is important to stress that our estimation approach and the underlying
data do not take into consideration that firms might have to close down their business in
the longer run, if they do not have the possibility to engage in outward FDI. Furthermore,
we do not consider backward or forward spillovers on other firms.17 These points indicate
that the long-run positive effect of outward FDI on home employment might even be
17E.g. Tang and Altshuler (2015) find positive spillover effects of outward FDI on domestic suppliers.
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more pronounced than our findings suggest.
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A Appendix: Foreign Employment by Destination
(a) 2002 (N=78) (b) 2013 (N=103)
Fig. A.1 Share of total foreign employment by destination
Notes: Number of firms N in parentheses.
(a) 2002 (N=78) (b) 2013 (N=100)
Fig. A.2 Share of total foreign employment in high-income countries
by destination
Notes: Number of firms N in parentheses.
29
(a) 2002 (N=46) (b) 2013 (N=74)
Fig. A.3 Share of total foreign employment in upper middle-income
countries by destination
Notes: Number of firms N in parentheses.
(a) 2002 (N=45)
(b) 2013 (N=73)
Fig. A.4 Share of total foreign employment in lower middle-income
countries by destination
Notes: Number of firms N in parentheses.
(a) 2002 (N=32) (b) 2013 (N=54)
Fig. A.5 Share of total foreign employment in low-income countries
by destination
Notes: Number of firms N in parentheses.
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B Appendix: FDI to upper middle-income countries
Table B.1 Displacement Effect for FDI into upper middle-income countries
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Home Empl. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.01 =0.02 =0.01 0.09 0.07 0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.28) (1.91) (1.20)
Lag Output (log) 0.36∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.32 0.20
(0.16) (0.12) (1.77) (0.76)
Capital (log) 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.21)
Exports (log) 0.66∗∗∗ 0.66
(0.18) (1.72)
Imports (log) 0.08 0.08
(0.09) (0.46)
Observations 369 369 369 369 369 369
First stage F-stat. 2.80 2.81 2.93
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. (10,000 iterations)
for columns 4–6. Five firms have been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote
14. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table B.2 Output Effect for FDI into upper middle-income countries
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Output (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.13∗ 0.07 0.06 =0.02
(0.07) (0.05) (0.48) (0.45)
Capital (log) 0.17 0.19
(0.13) (0.27)
Exports (log) 0.54∗∗ 0.54
(0.22) (0.41)
Imports (log) 0.11 0.10
(0.21) (0.44)
Observations 369 369 369 369
First stage F-stat. 2.80 2.79
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. (10,000 iterations)
for columns 3–4. Five firms have been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote
14. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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C Appendix: Robustness Checks
C.1 High-Income Countries: Drop USA
Table C.1 Displacement effect for FDI into high income countries: Drop USA
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Home Empl. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.03 =0.04 =0.04 0.05 =0.04 =0.04
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12)
Lag Output (log) 0.42∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
Capital (log) 0.08 0.08
(0.07) (0.09)
Exports (log) 0.11 0.11
(0.19) (0.19)
Imports (log) =0.02 =0.02
(0.08) (0.12)
Observations 545 545 545 545 545 545
First stage F-stat. 60.63 33.00 32.34
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. for columns 4–6. Two firms
have been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote 14. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table C.2 Output effect for FDI into high-income countries: Drop USA
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Output (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.21∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.18∗∗
(0.08) (0.06) (0.13) (0.09)
Capital (log) 0.16∗ 0.16∗
(0.08) (0.09)
Exports (log) 0.33∗∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.13) (0.14)
Imports (log) =0.02 =0.01
(0.08) (0.13)
Observations 545 545 545 545
First stage F-stat. 60.63 51.44
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. for columns 3–4. Two firms
have been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote 14. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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C.2 High-Income Countries: Income Classification of 2013
Table C.3 Displacement effect for high-income countries: Income class. 2013
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Home Empl. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.04 =0.05 =0.06∗ 0.20 0.11 0.10
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17)
Lag Output (log) 0.43∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.31∗ 0.24
(0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.17)
Capital (log) 0.08 0.07
(0.07) (0.08)
Exports (log) 0.10 0.08
(0.18) (0.20)
Imports (log) =0.03 =0.01
(0.08) (0.13)
Observations 553 553 553 553 553 553
First stage F-stat. 32.60 23.63 24.03
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. for columns 4–6.
Two firms have been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote 14. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table C.4 Output effect for high-income countries: Income class. 2013
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Output (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.25∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08)
Capital (log) 0.15∗ 0.13
(0.08) (0.08)
Exports (log) 0.31∗∗ 0.27∗∗
(0.12) (0.12)
Imports (log) =0.02 0.00
(0.07) (0.12)
Observations 553 553 553 553
First stage F-stat. 32.60 31.97
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. for columns 3–4.
Two firms have been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote 14. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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C.3 Lower-Middle Income Countries: Drop China
Table C.5 Displacement effect for FDI into lower-middle income countries: Drop China
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Home Empl. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.00 =0.03 =0.02 0.08 0.05 0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Lag Output (log) 0.24∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.17 0.14
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15)
Capital (log) 0.01 0.00
(0.05) (0.12)
Exports (log) 0.13 0.17
(0.24) (0.29)
Imports (log) =0.03 =0.05
(0.11) (0.28)
Observations 370 370 370 370 370 370
First stage F-stat. 18.74 18.68 17.61
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. for columns 4–6.
Two firms have been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote 14. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table C.6 Output effect for FDI into lower-middle income countries: Drop China
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Output (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.13∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.14∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07)
Capital (log) 0.13 0.12
(0.10) (0.15)
Exports (log) 0.37∗∗ 0.38∗
(0.17) (0.23)
Imports (log) =0.01 =0.02
(0.20) (0.38)
Observations 370 370 370 370
First stage F-stat. 18.74 18.72
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. for columns 3–4.
Two firms have been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote 14. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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C.4 Lower Middle-Income Countries: Income Classification of 2013
Table C.7 Displacement effect for lower middle-income countries: Income class. 2013
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Home Empl. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag For. Empl. (log) =0.12∗∗ =0.16∗∗ =0.13∗∗ =0.03 =0.10 =0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12)
Lag Output (log) 0.31∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.18
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14)
Capital (log) =0.05 =0.03
(0.03) (0.12)
Exports (log) 0.48∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗
(0.17) (0.32)
Imports (log) 0.02 0.04
(0.08) (0.27)
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267
First stage F-stat. 66.65 61.76 47.39
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. for columns 4–6.
Two firms have been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote 14. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table C.8 Output effect for lower-middle income countries: Income class. 2013
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Output (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.16∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Capital (log) 0.14 0.14
(0.12) (0.21)
Exports (log) 0.77∗∗ 0.93∗∗
(0.34) (0.45)
Imports (log) 0.04 0.06
(0.15) (0.37)
Observations 267 267 267 267
First stage F-stat. 66.65 56.63
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. for columns 3–4.
Two firms have been removed from this estimation for reasons explained in footnote 14. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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C.5 Low-Income Countries: Drop India
Table C.9 Displacement effect for FDI into low-income countries: Drop India
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Home Empl. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.14∗ 0.12 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.08
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.70) (0.52) (2.63)
Lag Output (log) 0.22∗ 0.20 0.23 0.20
(0.11) (0.11) (0.19) (0.35)
Capital (log) =0.04 =0.04
(0.03) (0.68)
Exports (log) 0.33 0.33
(0.24) (3.21)
Imports (log) =0.04 =0.04
(0.09) (0.75)
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156
First stage F-stat. 4.12 3.82 4.25
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. for columns 4–6. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table C.10 Output effect for FDI into low-income countries: Drop India
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Output (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.12 0.10 0.78 0.73
(0.11) (0.12) (5.05) (12.47)
Capital (log) 0.10 0.19
(0.11) (1.60)
Exports (log) 0.67 0.13
(0.62) (11.63)
Imports (log) 0.07 0.24
(0.26) (3.75)
Observations 156 156 156 156
First stage F-stat. 4.12 4.13
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. for columns 3–4. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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C.6 Low-Income Countries: Income Classification of 2013
Table C.11 Displacement effect for low income countries: Income class. 2013
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Home Empl. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.06 0.04 0.01 =0.01 =0.21 0.00
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (1.25) (5.20) (6.32)
Lag Output (log) 0.16 0.59∗ 0.31 0.59
(0.28) (0.32) (4.98) (6.91)
Capital (log) =0.34∗ =0.35
(0.17) (3.02)
Exports (log) 0.46 0.48
(0.34) (16.68)
Imports (log) =0.34 =0.35
(0.53) (24.72)
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
First stage F-stat. 7.29 14.55 11.54
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. for columns 4–6. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table C.12 Output effect for low-income countries: Income class. 2013
Dep. Var.: Not instrumented Instrumented
Log of Output (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag For. Empl. (log) 0.08 0.05 0.63 0.04
(0.06) (0.03) (2.29) (0.23)
Capital (log) 0.40∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗
(0.08) (0.19)
Exports (log) =0.56∗∗∗ =0.54
(0.11) (0.81)
Imports (log) 1.34∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗
(0.38) (0.69)
Observations 100 100 100 100
First stage F-stat. 7.29 9.65
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Clustered std. err. in parentheses for columns 1–2 and bootstrap std. err. for columns 3–4. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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D List of Countries and Income Classification
Table D.1 Income Classification











Brunei Darussalam H H
Canada H H







Hong Kong SAR, China H H
Iceland H H
Ireland H H




Korea, Rep. H H
Kuwait H H
Luxembourg H H
Macao SAR, China H H
Malta H H
Netherlands H H








Taiwan, China H H
United Arab Emirates H H
Country Names 2002 2013
United Kingdom H H
United States H H





Costa Rica UM UM
Croatia UM H
















Saudi Arabia UM H
Slovak Republic UM H
St. Kitts and Nevis UM H
St. Lucia UM UM
Trinidad and Tobago UM H
Uruguay UM H













Country Names 2002 2013
Dominican Republic LM UM
Ecuador LM UM
Egypt, Arab Rep. LM LM
El Salvador LM LM
Guatemala LM LM
Honduras LM LM












Russian Federation LM H
South Africa LM UM
Sri Lanka LM LM
















Central African Republic L L
Chad L L
Congo, Dem. Rep. L L
Congo, Rep. L LM










Kyrgyz Republic L LM















Papua New Guinea L LM
Rwanda L L
Senegal L LM
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